

SECRET

OIR - STATE

DRAFT OUTLINE
From EG Discussion

June 24, 1951

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

Why did Malik make proposals on Korea:

I. Is it merely a propaganda device?

A. There is an argument for this supposition:

1. Conceivably the USSR might subsequently introduce so many complications as to nullify negotiations and facilitate their taking stronger military action in a short time. However, this would be hazardous, since we now have the initiative, and progress depends on our responses.

B. The arguments against are overwhelming:

1. The USSR has handed to us a clear opening for initiative which could cause most harmful backfire propaganda-wise.

2. The USSR faces a Communist military position in Korea which requires increasing Russian support with consequent increasing risk of counteraction in Manchuria and general war.

3. The circumstances of the speech:

(a) Selection of the date some time ago;

(b) Use of UN world network for presentation;

(c) Instant publication of text in USSR, showing full policy control.

4. The statement is a fully new twist in the absence of collateral conditions.

5. The statement in itself has an element of concession in recognizing the possibility of foregoing Korea n objective.

(Beyond this point there can be no equivalent assurance of conclusions, pending further evidence and reactions, notably from Peiping.)

SECRET

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☒ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S 0
Authority: HR 70-2

II. Is it designed to secure a brief and local breathing spell?

A. For this possibility: the Chinese need time for training and build-up.

B. Against this possibility:

1. Renewal of military action would be conspicuously on Communist initiative (we discount any USSR reliance on crazy action by Rhee).

2. Renewal of military action would involve greater risk of war.

3. Propaganda consequences of 1 and 2 would be deleterious.

III. Is it designed to secure a longer-term respite from risk of war?

A. For this possibility:

1. The USSR could push its military and political build-up.

2. The West and the US would experience great pressure towards delay or reversal of mobilization.

B. Against the possibility:

1. The USSR may consider US "ruling circles" so bent on war as not to be deterred by this development.

C. Further argument depends upon an over-all estimate of USSR capabilities and intentions beyond our present scope.

IV. Is it a cutting of losses?

A. For this possibility:

1. The USSR may have come to regard the Korean affair as a venture that has become unprofitable unless it is pushed into general war.

2. The USSR may feel the need to insure against any Chinese Communist defection under pressure of mounting

Korean war strain, and against a possible US overture for a peace settlement that requires China to break with Russia.

3. By moving from military to political action the USSR may reckon on advantages from lessened cohesiveness of the Western front and slowing or reversal of our mobilization.

4. There is considerable analogy to the Berlin blockade action.

B. Against this possibility: arguments would derive only from over-all USSR intentions.

V. Is it a first step towards an over-all detente? (This would imply an intention to avoid general war indefinitely, but to continue with political action.)

No evidence is available to support this point, which can be brought up only as a remote and conceivable logical deduction from this step.

OIR: Allan Evans; rjm 6-24-51